The Sudanese military and leaders of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) have continued to characterize their relationship in favourable terms despite growing signs of frosty ties between the two sides who are represented in the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC).
For starters, the council has not held meetings for months and all decisions are issued by the military side. SRF council members saw their roles limited to issuing on conflicts that break out in regions such as Darfur and Blue Nile.
The lack of full quorum TSC meetings prompted speculations of a breakdown in communication between the military and the ex-rebel leaders.
On October 21, the SRF issued a statement expressing “deep regret” for the renewed violence in the Blue Nile region and West Kordofan in which scores were killed and many more wounded and displaced.
A portion of the statement, however, raised eyebrows because it called on the “central authority” of which SRF is a part of, to intervene urgently to stop the bloodshed.
Banana sit-in: A year ago, and specifically on October 18th 2021, the gates of the Republican Palace were closed coinciding with a sit-in that was nicknamed the “banana sit-in” organized by pro-military groups.
As a result, the sovereign council was unable to meet and a week later the military led by Abdel-Fatah al-Burhan staged a military coup and removed the civilian government of Prime Minister Abdulla Hamdok. The civilian members of the council were removed except the SRF members. Al-Burhan briefly added new civilian members a month after the coup before relieving them last July.
Dysfunctional council: Since last June, the TSC meetings have stopped and sources told {Sudan Tribune} that this was due to sharp differences between the military and SRF leaders relating to measures undertaken since the military coup last year.
One of the sources said that council members are carrying out their duties individually from their offices and any meetings held are on a bilateral basis. Nonetheless, the members have continued to receive their remuneration packages.
The source noted that decisions are often issued in the name of the commander in chief which suggests no consultation with SRF.
Resentment:
Another source who is close to two TSC military members confirmed the chilly relationship for various reasons, most notably because two members of the council al-Hadi Idris and al-Tahir Hajar are at odds with the governor of Darfur Minni Arko Minnawi who is in good terms with the military.
He explained that the relationship is twofold and is linked to specific issues in accordance with the Juba Peace Agreement but differences regarding Darfur have continued to persist.
The source, who requested anonymity, revealed that military members of the Sovereign Council Shams al-Din Kabbashi and Ibrahim Jabir have expressed reservations against Idris and Hajar.
Furthermore, another source told Sudan Tribune that the disagreements are also fueled by having a chunk of the SRF that is closer to the army while a smaller group is closer to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemetti).
SRF denial:
But Mohamed Zakaria who is the secretary-general of the other SRF faction led by Minni Minnawi described these reports as “baseless” and that their leaders are in their posts in accordance with the Juba peace agreement which is “superior” to the constitutional document of 2019.
“All parties are keen to reach a consensus that establishes a completion of the transitional period,” he added.
Risk factors:
Analysts and international stakeholders worry that any fallout between the two sides may jeopardize the implementation of the Juba peace accord risking a return to war. Political observers on the other hand see such a scenario as a move to bring Sudan into full-blown military rule.
Source: Sudan Tribune