Day: October 23, 2021

Weekly reports on the latest conflict developments in Mozambique and Ethiopia are made available by the Cabo Ligado and Ethiopia Peace Observatory projects, respectively.

Last week in Africa, Burkinabe forces intensified airstrikes against Islamist militants; the government of the Central African Republic declared a unilateral ceasefire; two deadly attacks hit the capital in Somalia; and violence escalated against the main opposition party and its leader in Zimbabwe.

In Burkina Faso, a significant number of events including attacks and kidnappings of civilians by presumed Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and affiliated militants were reported in the East and Boucle du Mouhoun regions. Suspected JNIM militants and affiliates also launched deadly attacks on Burkinabe forces and Volunteer for Defense of Homeland (VDP) fighters. Meanwhile, the Burkinabe air force escalated airstrikes targeting assumed JNIM positions, as well as suspected Islamic State West Africa (ISWAP) Greater Sahara faction positions in the Soum department of the Sahel region for the first time since August. The airstrikes came as the presumed ISWAP Greater Sahara faction militants carried out several attacks in the tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. A deadly attack by the group on a mosque in the village of Abonkor in the Tillaberi region resulted in several civilian fatalities. The attack was followed by an IED explosion in the same location targeting Nigerien troops responding to the situation. Similarly, a number of civilians were killed and wounded in a series of IED explosions by assumed JNIM-affiliated fighters in the central and northern regions of Mali. Presumed Katiba Macina operatives also engaged in fire fights with security forces in Ivory Coast after months of no reported incidents in the country by the group.

In Nigeria, ISWAP Lake Chad faction militants fought against the military and Civilian Joint Task Force in several Local Government Areas (LGA) of Borno State. Military forces foiled a deadly ambush on a military base in Ngamdu, a border town between Yobe and Borno states. Meanwhile, violence perpetrated by communal militia continued last week. A militia attack on civilians in Sakajiki in Zamfara state left a dozen people dead and properties damaged while clashes between Nigerian forces and Zamfara militia in Niger and Katsina states resulted in over 40 fatalities. Elsewhere in Anambra state, as the gubernatorial elections draw close, the venue of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) campaign rally in the Ihiala LGA came under attack, leading to deadly clashes with security forces. The convoy of State Governor Willie Obiano was reportedly among those trapped in the clashes. The separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) denied any connections to the attack, blaming instead the Fulani militia (The Guardian, 15 October 2021).

In the Central African Republic, political violence continued between military forces (FACA) with Wagner Group mercenaries against militias aligned with the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC). In Bria in the Haute-Kotto prefecture, following a deadly fighting between CPC-affiliated Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) rebels and Wagner Group and FACA forces, Russian mercenaries abducted over 100 Fulani pastoralists suspected of supporting the rebels. Fulani civilians have often been targeted for their alleged support of the rebel groups. Last week ended with the Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadera declaring a unilateral ceasefire against armed groups.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, presumed Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels attacked several villages near Mamovei in the Beni territory of North-Kivu province over multiple days, killing at least 20 civilians. Elsewhere in North-Kivu, the Congolese armed forces arrested and detained the Head of the Nduma Defence of Congo-Renove of the Bwira splinter faction in Goma. In South-Kivu, the Mayi Mayi Biloze Bishambuke and their allies gained control of several villages in Fizi territory following clashes with Twirwaneho militia. The clashes were reportedly intended to prevent the Twirwaneho coalition from expanding their territory and displaced many ethnic Banyamulenge.

In Uganda, the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) claimed an attack on security forces in Kampala two weeks ago. This is the first time ISCAP is claiming an attack in Uganda.

In Kenya, an IED attack targeted a military convoy between Milimani and Baure in Lamu county. Al Shabaab claimed responsibility and over a dozen fatalities among Kenyan defense forces. In neighboring Somalia, the group continued its attacks. In the Daynile district of Mogadishu, a deadly IED explosion by the militants targeted a convoy of security forces. The same day, an Al Shabaab suicide bomber blew himself up at a busy restaurant in the capital Mogadishu’s Yaqshid district, leaving several people dead. Last week, security forces reportedly regained control of several villages from Al Shabaab militants in the Gedo and Middle Shabelle regions. They also retook Ceel Dheer town in Galgaduud after Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ) militants withdrew from the town. Over the past few weeks, ASWJ militants took over a number of villages in the region after nearly two years of inactivity.

Lastly, in Zimbabwe, violence escalated against the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Alliance members by police forces and the supporters of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. The convoy of Nelson Chamisa, Zimbabwe’s main opposition leader, was attacked by suspected Zanu-PF supporters in the southern Masvingo region. The attack followed the police raid on his private residence in the area to disperse a meeting.

Source: Armed Conflict Location

The World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Africa, through the Expanded Special Project for the Elimination of Neglected Tropical Diseases (ESPEN), is making available new analytical tools in the NTD Data Portal allowing Neglected Tropical Diseases programmes and stakeholders to better track rollout and impact of interventions, and make data-driven decisions on strategies.

A dedicated data portal for NTD programmes

The consolidated repository hosts data shared by health ministries through the Joint Application Package reporting system and provides a detailed ongoing picture of the status of Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs) programmes targeting Preventive Chemotherapy NTDs (PC-NTDs). Information is linked at the implementation unit level and can be freely accessed, enabling better tracking of progress, supporting cross-disease coordination, and facilitating comprehensive forward planning. Through the portal, users can readily view, download and validated, reliable longitudinal data and maps for planning and reporting purposes.

“It’s vital that countries do more to combat the variety of Neglected Tropical Diseases that are sadly still so prevalent across so much of Africa, causing millions of citizens severe disabilities and sometimes their lives. Access to updated and more accurate data is vital for countries to implement strategic plans that can truly help to save more lives and eliminate NTDs,” said Dr Maria Rebollo Polo, ESPEN Team Leader at WHO Regional Office for Africa.

“We encourage Neglected Tropical Disease control programmes across Africa to use this innovative tool so that their activities and investments result in real impact and can be coordinated in the most efficient way, making the most of often scarce resources,” Dr Polo said.

New analytical tools for guiding NTD country programmes

Evidence-based decision making for Neglected Tropical Diseases helps drive progress. The ESPEN Data Portal has expanded to include a comprehensive suite of data dashboards designed to help Neglected Tropical Diseases programmes better track rollout and impact of interventions and make data-driven decisions on future strategies.

The new ESPEN Progress and Forecast dashboards allow users to explore key statistics and analytics, graphics and maps, at both sub-national and national level. They outline current endemicity and progress on mass drug administration (MDA) interventions to date for each of the PC-NTDs, together with future treatment and impact assessment needs over the next ten years. The dashboards have been purpose designed to support national programmes to readily access and use their data, make better-informed decisions, and distribute resources more efficiently. Disease-specific dashboards can be accessed through country pages – simply visit your country page, and select the disease you’re interested in.

Making better use of our data

To complement the existing suite of maps and datasets, WHO Regional Office for Africa has now developed interactive dashboards detailing both current progress and projections for the next 10 years at the level of implementation. Using historical data compiled under the ESPEN data repository, we have forecasted when MDA interventions will be needed, what type of MDA strategy should be implemented (considering co-endemicity), and when impact assessment should be conducted, to achieve the goals established by the new 2021-2030 Roadmap for the Elimination of Neglected Tropical Diseases. These resources can greatly support completion of both National Neglected Tropical Diseases Masterplans, and Annual Work Plans.

These are new tools and, as such, may still be improved based on the feedback received from data portal users. We hugely value feedback from Neglected Tropical Diseases country programmes and partners on these new resources, and the portal in general Please send us your questions, comments, and inputs on the new developments to espensupport@who.int

About ESPEN

ESPEN is a WHO project created in the spirit of a public-private partnership with the goal of accelerating the elimination of five PC-NTDs in Africa. Since its launch in May 2016, ESPEN works with domestic and international partners to leverage US$ 17.8 billion in drug donations from pharmaceutical companies to expand coverage and access to treatments, strengthen health systems and provide Universal health coverage of interventions against PC-NTDs in Africa until we reach final elimination of these devastating diseases.

Source: World Health Organization

Yesterday evening (22 October), Security Council members departed for a visiting mission to Mali and Niger. France and Niger are co-leading the mission, which will take place from today (23 October) to Monday (25 October). This will be the Council’s first visiting mission since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic last year.

The visiting mission has several main objectives. In Mali, Council members aim to assess the progress on Mali’s political transition, including preparations for next year’s legislative and presidential elections; examine the implementation of Mali’s 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement; and evaluate the security crisis in central Mali. A key focus of the Niger leg of the trip will be the Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S), especially in light of the Secretary-General’s 5 October letter to the Council on options to increase support for the FC-G5S.

Mali Visit

During the visit to Mali, Council members are likely to remain in Bamako, where they are expected to meet with representatives of the transitional government, the signatory parties to the 2015 peace agreement, the international mediation team to the accord, and of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). They will also meet with civil society organisations—including women and youth organisations—and with representatives of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and other UN entities in Mali.

A major focus of the Mali visit will be the political transition, which was established for an 18-month period after the August 2020 coup d’état that ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. The first round of legislative and presidential elections for restoring constitutional order is scheduled for 27 February 2022. But since a second coup d’état on 24 May that ousted the transition’s top civilian leaders and made Colonel Assimi Goïta transitional president, Mali appears increasingly unlikely to hold these elections on time. The Secretary-General’s latest report on Mali, dated 1 October, expresses “great concern” regarding delays in “preparations for the holding of general elections and the completion of the political transition”.

ECOWAS, which negotiated the transition with military authorities in September 2020 and early October 2020, reiterated its demands at a special summit last month that the elections be held “within the non-negotiable deadline of February 2022”, and decided that it would impose sanctions on those negatively impacting the transition’s completion. Council members have supported ECOWAS’ efforts since last year to restore constitutional order, and they are likely to reiterate their expectation during the visiting mission that the elections take place as planned. At the same time, the mission is an opportunity for Council members to consult with interlocutors, including ECOWAS, to gain a better understanding of the feasibility of these elections being organised by February and how the Council can support and reinforce the transition so it can be completed.

The Council also intends to assess the implementation of the 2015 Mali Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and learn more about the steps envisaged by the parties to implement the accord. The security situation, particularly the crisis in central Mali, is another important focus. As noted in the Secretary-General’s report, extremist groups are increasing their territorial control— including through instituting blockades of villages in the central region— and insecurity continues to spread into southern areas. Council members are likely to seek more information on measures by the authorities to implement a comprehensive politically-led strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence, and re-establish state presence, authority and basic services in central Mali.

The terms of reference for the visiting mission note that the Council will discuss the Secretary-General’s 16 July report on the progress of MINUSMA’s Force Adaptation Plan and recommendations on the mission’s force levels and troop and police ceiling—a report that the Council requested, because of the growing insecurity in central Mali, through resolution 2584 of 29 June which renewed MINUSMA’s mandate. The Secretary-General’s 15 July report proposes increasing MINUSMA’s authorised force ceiling by 2,069 uniformed personnel.

The Council began negotiations last month on a draft resolution to raise the force ceiling based on the recommendation. However, these discussions were put on hold as Mali raised objections—apparently over not being consulted on the proposal— and contended that the additional troops would not make a difference unless they were also given a more robust mandate. For his part, the Secretary-General indicated in his July report that the troop increase will not make a sustained difference unless the Malian authorities develop a political strategy for reinforcing the presence of the state and protecting civilians. The meeting of Council members with the transitional authorities in Mali may be an opportunity to further discuss the issue.

The terms of reference note that the Council intends to assess “human rights challenges and the mechanisms in place to monitor and address these”. Council members also aim to examine the broader UN response to address drivers of conflict and wider governance challenges.

This will be the fifth Council visiting mission to Mali since MINUSMA was established in 2013. The Council previously visited the country in February 2014, March 2016, October 2017 (when it also went to Burkina Faso and Mauritania) and March 2019 (when it also went to Burkina Faso). This mission comes amid recent public tensions between Malian authorities and France, since Paris’ announcement in June, shortly after the 24 May coup, that it would draw down its 5,100-member regional counter-terrorism force, Operation Barkhane, to about 2,500-3,000 troops. Subsequently, there have been reports that Mali is considering a deal to allow the Wagner Group, a Russian private military contractor, to deploy to the country.

Niger Visit

From Mali, Council members will travel to Niamey to hold meetings with Niger’s government and the UN Country Team. They are also expected to meet with Major General Oumar Bikimo, the force commander of the FC-G5S, and Eric Tiare, the Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel, which comprises Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

During the visit, Council members are expected to exchange views with the Nigerien authorities on the security, humanitarian and development situation in the Sahel. They will discuss efforts to protect refugees and internally displaced persons, and the effects of climate change on the region.

A prominent subject is likely to be support for the FC-G5S, which G5 Sahel countries established in 2017 to fight terrorist and transnational criminal groups in the region. In a letter dated 4 October, the Secretary-General proposes two options to increase support to the FC-G5S. One option is a dedicated UN office to provide logistical support to joint force operations. The Secretary-General said in his letter that he prefers this option— which he has recommended since 2017—because he considers it as the most effective approach to providing predictable support, including funding, for the FC-G5S.

According to the Secretary-General’s letter, this option would entail expanding support currently provided by MINUSMA (life consumables and medical evacuation within Mali’s borders) to cover engineering, maintenance, communications and information technology services; cargo transportation; medical supplies; and medical and casualty evacuation in all areas of FC-G5S operations. The office could be funded through UN assessed contributions or donor funding. It could either be designed with a heavier reliance on UN-provided service delivery that entails a greater UN staff footprint, or it could maximize the use of outsourcing, with a lighter UN footprint.

The second option is to establish an “Advisory Office to the G5 Sahel Executive Secretariat”. This office would provide technical and expert assistance to enhance the FC-G5S’s self-sufficiency by providing advice in the areas of political affairs, human rights, operational planning, and administrative planning, including on modalities for adequate pooling and sharing of resources.

Council members remain divided over the question of how to support the FC-G5S. France and Niger are strong advocates for establishing a UN office that provides logistical support. The UK and US, on the other hand, have strongly opposed the idea. They object to using UN assessed contributions for non-UN missions and are not convinced that such a support office can be more effective than bilateral military support. They have also raised concerns, that some other members appear to share, about establishing a UN operation to support a counter-terrorism operation which could compromise UN peacekeeping principles and put the UN in the position of providing support to the FC-G5S despite its reported human rights violations.

In discussing the FC-G5S, Council members intend to assess the implementation of the UN human rights due diligence policy that establishes standards for receiving UN support. According to the terms of reference, the Council will also reiterate its view that the stabilisation of the Sahel requires an integrated response led by the region’s governments, with support from the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), regional organisations and the wider international community.

The Council last visited Niger as part of its March 2017 visiting mission to the Lake Chad basin that also went to Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria.

Upon returning to New York, the Council is scheduled to have a briefing on Mali on 29 October, when the visiting mission’s co-leads are expected to present their report on the mission.

Source: UN Security Council

Gunmen attacked a jail in Nigeria’s Oyo State late Friday and freed more than 800 inmates by force, the third such major attack this year, prison service said in a statement Saturday.

The prison service said the attackers were heavily armed and after an exchange of gunfire with prison officers, gained entry to the prison yard by blasting the walls with dynamite.

Some 575 inmates, who were all awaiting trial, were missing while 262 escapees had since been recaptured, it said, adding that the jail housed only 64 convicts, who did not escape.

“While all the awaiting trial detainees were forced out of custody, the cells housing the convicts and the female inmates were not vandalized,” the prison service said.

Nigeria is struggling with security problems across its vast territory, including a spate of abductions of students for ransom by criminal gangs in the northwest and an Islamist insurgency in the northeast.

The jail attack in Oyo follows similar attacks in Imo state in April where more than 1,800 inmates were freed, while another 266 prisoners were forcibly released in Kogi state last month.

Source: Voice of America